Water Scarcity, Conflict and Compensatory Mechanisms: A Case Study of Israel and Egypt by Pranikoff, Sam
Pranikoff 1 
Sam Pranikoff 
POLI 693H 
 
Water Scarcity, Conflict and Compensatory Mechanisms: A Case Study of Israel and 
Egypt 
 
 
Introduction 
 
After air itself, water is the most essential element for the sustenance of life on 
earth (Ahuja 2015). To survive, humans need a consistent supply of the resource on a 
daily basis, and in the Middle East, this basic requirement is becoming increasingly 
difficult to fulfill. As anthropogenic climate change continues to alter the planet, 
warming the globe to temperatures unseen within the span of modern civilization, 
many scientists speculate that the transcontinental expanse composed of Western Asia 
and Egypt could be subjected to some of the world’s most extreme future changes 
(Nature 2015).  
As temperatures continue to rise, the geographic distribution of water on earth 
is expected to be altered significantly, becoming more plentiful in some places, and 
less so in others; in the Middle East, water is expected to become increasingly scarce 
(Vidal 2015). This scarcity currently manifests itself in the resource being either a 
strong contributing factor or a primary catalyst to conflict. The threat of these trends is 
underlined by the region’s rapidly increasing population, which is projected to grow by 
more than 235 million by 2050 (Pew Research Center 2015). As water availability 
declines, and demand for the resource increases with the growing population, 
increasing tensions seem largely inevitable. 
The threat of water scarcity to peace is further underscored by the Middle 
East’s already virulent political volatility and strained relations amongst and within its 
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member nations (Sherman 1999). This worrisome outlook is reinforced by limited, yet 
telling, historical precedent which illustrates the complicated and very real connection 
between water and conflict. A secondary, and closely related issue exists in the 
region’s ability to provide adequate nourishment to its population through agriculture, 
by far the largest user of the resource (Barton 2016). The ongoing imbroglio in the 
Middle East, a situation that will only worsen with time, serves as a potent reminder of 
the importance of water in maintaining global peace and stability. 
One of the primary factors attributed to the rise in protest and violence are the 
demographics of Middle Eastern nations themselves. Citizens between the ages of 15 
and 29 account for more than 30% of the total working-age population in the group of 
countries (Alter & Allam 2016). These individuals, faced with high unemployment and 
lack of education—those which fall far short of their self-perceived needs—are 
angered by the lack of basic opportunity to create a better life for themselves (Jalbout 
& Farah 2016). With the continued dissent which citizens have towards their 
respective governments and the religious and cultural animosity which exists between 
both intra- and inter-state ethnic groups, the trend of conflict has remained largely 
unwavering. These rancorous attitudes are also exemplified by individuals within the 
region deriving their primary identity from their religious affiliation instead of their 
nationality (Kessler 2016). 
In 2011, a wave of protest and demonstrations known as the Arab Spring served 
as a potent reminder of the territory’s high degree of volatility and the constant threat 
of violent escalation which the Middle East faces (Botelho 2015). Since the uprisings, 
civil war and genocide has racked Syria, the long-enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
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has remained, the Taliban has emerged as a prominent threat in Afghanistan as it 
continues to seize control of more territory from the national government, and a civil 
war in Iraq against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant has begun (Tharoor 2015). 
These circumstances both underscore the formidable challenges which the Middle East 
faces in achieving peace and help to demonstrate how water scarcity would provide yet 
another onus to an already struggling geographic region. As such, given the high 
degree of existing political instability present in the Middle East, tensions from water 
have the potential to send the region into a state of even greater destabilization. 
Prospects for peace and diplomacy between countries within the transcontinental area 
are already beleaguered by the presence of a wide spectrum of radically differing 
cultural and religious stances; the added and continuously increasing strain imposed by 
water scarcity could cause escalation to an extent where peace is no longer possible 
(Miller 2016). 
Though heightened water scarcity in the Middle East—as well as the potential 
for conflict created by this severe resource shortage—seems imminent based upon all 
of the aforementioned circumstances, it is also important to note that the region’s 
aridity is not a novel phenomenon (Wessels 2009). While the water crisis in the Middle 
East is indeed becoming more severe, water scarcity has always been a significant 
problem and “a security issue” for the transcontinental expanse—one popularly 
characterized around the world as a land of scorching temperatures and endemic 
desiccation (Bilgin 2005). However, despite this longstanding historical resource 
scarcity, over the course of modern history, both the scope and quantity of conflicts 
whose origins can be directly linked to water scarcity are surprisingly small and few, 
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respectively (Allan 2002). When taking into account the region’s longstanding political 
and social rifts, the lack of conflict catalyzed by water scarcity and further exacerbated 
by the two former factors is even more puzzling. From 1950 to 2016, the Pacific 
Institute’s Water Conflict Chronology Timeline lists only 70 minor water-based 
instances of conflict (Pacific Institute). It seems that the numerous aforementioned 
tensions present in past years combined with the region’s rapidly diminishing fresh 
water resources would have already set the Middle East on an expedient course 
towards greater water-based conflict in both quantity and scale. 
A primary explanation for the lack of water-based conflict in the Middle East—
despite a notably conducive set of circumstances for fostering this type of clash—can 
be understood by examining infrastructural and economic mechanisms in Israel and 
Egypt. From the two countries’ foundings to the present, this duo of strikingly different 
sovereign nations has increasingly used compensatory, patchwork infrastructural and 
economic mechanisms to prevent what might otherwise be—or perhaps, could long 
ago have been—a violent battleground for the planet’s most important resource. 
Without the piecemeal policies, trade agreements, government building initiatives, and 
drives in innovation, these two Middle Eastern countries might have already been in 
the midst of a bloody and rapidly deteriorating scourge of water-based conflict. 
Though water-based conflict does indeed seem imminent, if not for the deliberate 
efforts like those made by Israel and Egypt, the Middle East today would likely be in a 
much greater state of disarray.  
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Literature Review 
 
Considerable research and academic publication has focused on both water and 
conflict as general disciplines. Significant study has also been dedicated to the study of 
water-based conflict. Finally, there has been a significant body of research 
concentrated on the aforementioned infrastructural and economic mechanisms—those 
labeled as compensatory efforts—by sovereign nations in the Middle East to actively 
mitigate the effects of severe water scarcity. The primary goal of the research is to 
connect these major disciplines and themes together in a manner that logically posits 
the research question itself. To remain in line with this objective, it is imperative that 
only the most relevant pieces are chosen and adopted for the research question due to 
its comparatively narrow focus on water scarcity impacting conflict and the role that 
government initiatives have played in stalling or preventing pervasive water-based 
conflict. Within the stated question, the overarching theme is twofold. The first facet 
relates to the presence of water shortages and their ability to influence—or directly 
cause—conflict, while the second is focused on examining the degree of influence that 
Israeli and Egyptian economic and infrastructural mechanisms have had in preventing 
water-based conflict. 
Within the literature, numerous links exist which will help to build a connection 
between not just water and conflict, but more specifically show a significant 
correlation between water scarcity and conflict. Furthermore, close ties can also be 
made between the deliberate actions taken by the two Middle Eastern nations 
discussed in this case study and the forestalling of what could have otherwise been a 
virulent series of water-based bloodshed. This type of information will represent a 
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significant portion of the literature needed to thoroughly explore the question itself. 
While many of these topics are commonly discussed in the greater body of literature, 
little, if any, material exists which explicitly employs case studies of government and 
non-government-sponsored compensatory efforts to avoid water conflict as a means to 
both demonstrate the link between water and conflict and to help frame the severe 
future threat that it represents. 
Fortunately, significant documentation exists on the Middle East that relates not 
only to the primary facets of the question but also to all of its underlying, 
interconnecting dynamics. These topics include, but are not limited to: anthropogenic 
climate change, agriculture, population growth, public infrastructure, resource scarcity, 
water as a human right, public health, resource-driven conflict and oil as a source of 
governmental instability. In this way, the research topic fits well within a collection of 
previously conducted work done on climate change, water scarcity, conflict, water-
based conflict, international trade, agricultural production, and food security. 
Literature on water scarcity’s current effects and potential future trajectory is 
produced primarily by individuals operating within the academic spheres of ecological 
and environmental studies. Though the topic of the research question is political by 
nature, the environmental facet is of equal importance to examining the issue from all 
relevant angles. Anthropogenic climate change—momentarily leaving aside the 
staggeringly high consumption of water by human activity—stands as one of the 
primary culprits of the ongoing water crisis and its bleak forecasted future progression 
(Haddeland, et al. 2014). The increasingly scarce global freshwater supply will have 
widespread implications, such as projected agricultural shortages and decreased human 
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health in the Middle East in the not so distant future. Zakar and Fischer (2012) 
discusses the anticipated potential effects of “climate change-induced water scarcity” 
and its imminent adverse effect on human health. Large quantities of literature focus 
not only on the public health scares which could be caused by future desiccation, but 
also on the startling implications which the same macroscopic environmental changes 
could have on the Middle East’s agricultural sector. A piece by Martin Keulertz 
substantiates on this impending threat and discusses its potentially disastrous 
consequences (Keulertz 2015). 
Though water scarcity is a scourge environmentally, to contextualize the 
importance and practical relevance of the general research topic within the current 
international geopolitical sphere, the current situation in the Middle East must first be 
examined. The Middle East is a land of paradoxical extremes. The region is 
collectively endowed with a significant percentage of the world’s proven oil reserves; 
however, water is notably scarce both in real terms and within the context of the area’s 
population on a per-capita basis. The status of many of the Middle Eastern countries as 
oil-rich states plays a significant factor in their susceptibility to conflict catalyzed by 
water scarcity. Karl (1997) provides a thorough explanation of the underlying political 
mechanisms of the petro-states which have formed as a result of the nations’ high 
degree of economic reliance on petroleum export revenues (Karl 1997). However, 
Karl’s “paradox of plenty” is only one of a number of paradoxes within the region 
relevant to the research question.  
Another striking dichotomy is polarized availability of water and oil, a topic 
discussed in detail 
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nexus in the Middle East and North Africa” (Lowi, 2008). Though the transcontinental 
region accounts for 10 percent of the planet’s land mass and approximately 5 percent 
of its total population, it “contains less than 1 percent of the world’s freshwater 
resources” (El Hassan, 2014). Relatedly, a piece by Prince El Hassan offers a thorough 
analysis on the Middle Eastern water crisis as both a threat to peace in the region and 
an opportunity to maintain a relatively harmonious atmosphere. His assertions provide 
a sturdy platform for a better holistic understanding of the macroscopic dynamics of 
the topic. These simple and straightforward ideas, when accompanied with the 
infrangibly related state of political tension within the region, represent perhaps the 
purest possible distillation of the relevance of the research topic. 
 The next body of literature that exists relating to the research topic is that of 
water scarcity and lack of access to water as a source of conflict. To properly frame 
this facet of the larger subject, access to clean water should be seen as both a basic and 
inalienable right given its crucial role in supporting human life. Numerous works focus 
on this particular idea; however, a piece by Simone Klawitter focuses exclusively on 
the understanding of water as a basic human right within the geographical context of 
the Middle East (Klawitter, 2005). From this, literature specifically focusing on the 
causal effect that water scarcity has on conflict must be addressed. Large volumes of 
published papers aptly match the myriad precedent which exists for water being a 
source of tensions and even a direct source of tangible conflict. Hensel (2007) provides 
an interesting and focused discussion on armed conflict over rivers which cross 
international borders and is riddled with potent examples of such occurrences (Hensel, 
2007). However, looking only at conflict itself does not provide an adequately 
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satisfactory landscape of the entire issue. One of the chief components of water as a 
source of conflict—especially in the Middle East—are the high political tensions 
which it can engender between neighboring countries with already strained relations. 
Several pieces exist which address the issue. One of these publications, by Shiomi 
Dinar, seeks to frame the complex political issue facing the Middle East at large by 
using an example within the region of the imbroglio facing Syria, Iraq, and Turkey 
over the Tigris-Euphrates Basin (Dinar, 2012). 
 The research seeks to connect the already well-established bodies of study 
found in water scarcity and water-based conflict, while also simultaneously 
acknowledging and demonstrating that the lack of water-based conflict in the Middle 
East which has occurred up to the present can primarily be attributed to the 
infrastructural and economic mechanisms—such as those employed by Israel and 
Egypt —which have manifested themselves as stop-gap measures. In this way, the goal 
is to further demonstrate both the substantive link between water and conflict and the 
severity of the situation in the Middle East by highlighting that the current 
circumstances would be far worse without the substantive and deliberate intervention 
which has taken place in both nations contained within the case study.  
Despite the study of water-based conflict and the presence of some instances in 
the Middle East, within the scope of history, the prevalence of conflict catalyzed by 
water shortages has been relatively scarce. This trend, at least in Israel and Egypt, can 
be primarily attributed to the infrastructural and economic mechanisms created by 
within the two nations. This topic represents the final body of literature. Myriad 
literature exists which serves to showcase the many solutions, policies and innovations 
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which have been devised in an effort to avoid water-based calamity in the Middle East. 
While literature does exist on these topics, little if any work has been focused 
specifically on the infrangible relationship between the infrastructural and economic 
mechanisms and their primary role in largely averting—at least up to the present—
water-based conflict. While many of the measures may not have been made with the 
explicit intention of preventing water scarcity from causing conflict, all of the 
compensatory actions were implemented as a direct result of water scarcity which 
exists in the Middle East. The research seeks to add this topic to the existing body of 
literature. 
 
Theory 
The theory presents it assertions in two distinct, but infrangibly related 
elements. The first element of the theory discusses and explains the concept of water-
based conflict, showing the causal relationship between water and conflict; it strives to 
exemplify how water, under the correct circumstances, has been, and will likely 
continue to be, a notable cause of conflict. This piece of the theory is included to help 
further underscore the second and primary theoretical component, which focuses on 
the role of infrastructural and economic mechanisms in preventing water-based 
conflict. This theoretical component asserts that both infrastructural and economic 
mechanisms have served a vital role in promoting general peace and stability within 
the region, and, more specifically, from preventing consistent and increasingly severe 
water-based conflict in both Israel and Egypt. It seeks to explain this phenomenon and 
show that the implementation of infrastructural and economic mechanisms has served 
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to significantly hamper the full potential manifestation of water as a cause of conflict 
in the Middle East. Using foresight and long-term planning, both nations have used 
and exemplified the potency of the two aforementioned mechanisms as a means by 
which to decrease the likelihood of facing a degree of water scarcity severe enough to 
precipitate consistent and substantial water-based conflict. When combined, these two 
theoretical elements help to offer an explanation for why the Middle East, despite 
being one of the driest regions on the planet, has managed to remain largely free of 
significant and consistent water-based conflict. Though precedent for water as a cause 
of conflict exists, when looking at the endemic desiccation which has long plagued the 
Middle East, it seems as if there have been a relatively insignificant number of water-
based conflicts. 
The first part of the theory provides an in-depth explanation of water-based 
conflict and seeks to demonstrate how water scarcity can serve as a primary cause of 
conflict. It seeks to do so by demonstrating how water scarcity alone can precipitate 
conflict but also how the effects of water scarcity—namely food scarcity—can 
intensify and add to its potential to cause conflict. It is important to acknowledge that 
the relationship between water and conflict is both complex and multifaceted. Because 
of its necessity, water can certainly cause conflict, but it is often not the sole catalyst of 
“war or violent conflict” (Pacific Institute). It is, rather, an important element among 
several factors which lead to escalating tensions, all of which can eventually produce a 
tangible clash. However, in the Middle East, many of these other factors are already 
present. As discussed in the introduction, sensitivity to conflict in the region is already 
heightened by the poverty, unemployment, and general lack of opportunity among 
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younger demographics in the region’s general population (Jalbout & Farah 2016). 
History has repeatedly demonstrated that resource—and more specifically water—
scarcity can be a primary driver of conflict. In the hierarchy of material importance, 
water reigns supreme. Humans rely on the substance for countless functions, many of 
which are required to carry out a life of both comfort and decency. Because of water’s 
status as a basic necessity, when the substance is absent or scarce, the inability by local 
and national governments to fulfill citizens’ basic daily needs can spark outrage, 
dissent, and, eventually, conflict. The results of these clashes can be devastating to a 
country and its people. The concept of water as a primary conflict-driver is 
fundamental to the overarching assertion that the resource—due to infrastructural and 
economic mechanisms like those implemented in Israel and Egypt—has been 
relatively benign as a catalyst of conflict up to the present in the Middle East. It also 
helps to underscore the potential challenges that the future holds for the region due to 
trends of ever-increasing desiccation and population. 
While the absence of water alone can certainly cause conflict, lack of the 
resource also directly drives another important contributor to upheaval: famine. Food 
scarcity has been shown to be a “threat and multiplier for violent conflict” (Notaras 
2011). The relationship between water and food scarcity is relatively simple: when 
water is scarce, it is more expensive (Bhagat 2014). Furthermore, in times of drought, 
the amount of water that can be allocated to agriculture also has the potential to be 
reduced. In almost all circumstances, this means that less food is being produced and, 
as a result, the price per calorie of food will rise. Demand for food, however, is not 
similarly diminished in times of water scarcity and price inflation—it remains 
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constant. This direct linkage between water scarcity and food scarcity serves to 
underpin the notion of water’s potential to serve as a potent destabilizing force in the 
Middle East. 
Rifts stemming from water are fundamentally similar to frictions caused by 
competing parties struggling to procure any other important resource. Resource 
competition, a well-documented phenomenon in the natural world, is equally present 
among humans. The spectacle occurs when two or more competing parties have an 
expressed interest in procuring a commodity of limited availability. Today, the world’s 
human population has surpassed a sustainable rate of water consumption, meaning that 
as scarcity increases, so too will tensions between parties pursuing the same dwindling 
supply of the resource (Gleeson, Wada, Bierkens, & Beek 2012). In this way, water, 
oil, and numerous other important commodities necessary for the maintenance of the 
current status quo of humanity are fundamentally similar (Klare 2013).  
In addition to challenges faced by water scarcity itself, many Middle Eastern 
countries face an interesting paradox in which they have abundant petroleum 
resources, but are severely lacking in water for their population. While this 
phenomenon is only present in Egypt and not Israel, it is being included because it 
helps to highlight the major role that an important resource can play in precipitating 
conflict. Middle Eastern nations have experienced many historical instances of conflict 
over their oil resources, very similar to those which could be fought in the future over 
aquatic stores (Jaffe & Elass 2015). A related, but distinctly different phenomenon 
exists in the concept of the “paradox of plenty,” which refers to the paradox present in 
mineral-rich countries, which in large part due to their wealth, have weak development 
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results and economic growth compared to that of nations with low degrees of natural 
resource abundance (Karl 1997). Weak development outcomes in these countries make 
them even more susceptible to tension caused by water scarcity. Oil is also relevant 
because energy derived from fossil fuels can be used for desalination—a process in 
which salt water is transformed into fresh, potable water—however, the fiscal and 
environmental costs of deploying the technology to the necessary region-wide scale 
would be immense (Ball 2015). Though a potential solution to solving a civilian water 
shortage, even if these plants were able to produce enough water to satisfy municipal 
needs, citizens represent a small fraction of the overall demand for water. 
A final, but important element to the theoretical framework of water scarcity 
causing conflict is that of agriculture. Though a potential lack of water for direct 
human consumption is indeed the greatest concern, the region’s primary consumer of 
water is for growing food. Anthropogenic climate change is expected to expedite the 
trend of desertification in the region (Miret 2013). As water becomes scarcer, and 
desertification continues to render formerly fertile land unfit for cultivation, famine 
will emerge as a primary concern due to the inability of manmade irrigation to 
compensate for the progressively drier conditions (Kemp 2004). Just like it is for the 
supply of water for human consumption, a growing population will only serve as an 
exacerbating factor for food shortage (Emmott 2015). Though the specific effects of 
anthropogenic climate change cannot be predicted with any high degree of certainty, 
what is known is that the Middle East will become hotter and dryer, both of which will 
intensify the issues of water scarcity and food shortage. With threats of drought and 
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famine present in the Middle East’s future, two strong requisite conditions for political 
tension and potential conflict will be put solidly in place. 
The second component of the theory asserts that infrastructural and economic 
mechanisms play an important role in preventing water-based conflict. This theoretical 
component can be further broken down into two parts: one focusing on infrastructural 
mechanisms and the other on economic mechanisms. The theory seeks to use the case 
studies of Israel and Egypt to demonstrate the effectiveness of both types of 
mechanisms in reducing the potential for water-based conflict. For the purposes of 
explaining how infrastructural and economic mechanisms can both reduce the potential 
for and prevent water-based conflict, it is important to understand the difference 
between water scarcity and inaccessibility. Scarcity refers to the actual quantity of 
water possessed by a country, whereas inaccessibility refers to the degree which end 
users within a country have reliable access to water. Furthermore, water scarcity and 
inaccessibility can exist both mutually and independently of each other. Countries can 
be replete with extensive water resources, but they may not be adequately available to 
end-users. Similarly, even when water resources are scarce, an adequate minimal 
quantity of water can sometimes still be supplied. Finally, when water scarcity 
becomes sufficiently severe—the degree of which is dependent upon the specific 
circumstances of a given country—it can result in water inaccessibility. 
While the implementation of water-based infrastructure is often complex, the 
theoretical manner in which infrastructural mechanisms prevent water-based conflict is 
relatively straightforward. When humans lack the ability to physically obtain water, the 
potential for conflict is heightened significantly. As the amount of time without water 
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increases, so too does the level of tension and the potential for conflict. Water-based 
infrastructure seeks to address both water scarcity and water inaccessibility—the lack 
of adequate water resources by a country and the inability to access water by end users, 
respectively—in two primary ways: production and distribution. For production, 
desalination, filtration and wastewater treatment plants can be implemented to become 
a new and significant source of potable water. The implementation of these key pieces 
of infrastructure can provide a desperately needed infusion of water to a nation’s 
overall supply, helping to lessen the severity of a country’s water scarcity. However, 
even when a state possesses adequate water resources, it still must have a means by 
which to reliably distribute the commodity to all of its end users. To fill this need, the 
inclusion of pipes and canals in strategic locations can ensure that all of a 
government’s constituents have access to the water they need. Water-based 
infrastructure helps to prevent conflict because it offers solutions to address issues of 
both scarcity and accessibility. 
Compared to its physical counterpart, an economic mechanism can manifest 
itself in many more forms depending on the individual circumstances of the given 
nation and its specific needs. Economic mechanisms are those which seek to remedy 
perverse incentives, fix market failures, ensure affordability, and act as a redistributive 
apparatus which helps to fund water-based infrastructure projects. Economic 
mechanisms are closely linked to the existence of infrastructural mechanisms, as the 
two very often work together in a symbiotic fashion to compose a holistic and 
successful national water management strategy. While economic mechanisms exist in 
an abstract form and can often be seen as indirect, their impact is nearly always 
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concrete and can be of equal substantive value to that of infrastructural mechanisms; 
by employing carefully designed rules and regulations, economic mechanisms, like 
infrastructural mechanisms, can help countries to ameliorate the impact of, or entirely 
eliminate, water scarcity and inaccessibility.  
To address issues related to water scarcity, economic mechanisms can be used 
to incentivize users to consume less water through charging for the commodity’s true 
cost and taxing for excessive usage. When less water is used on a per-capita basis, 
even when its overall availability within a country stays constant, by definition, 
scarcity decreases. Economic mechanisms can also indirectly help to address scarcity 
through their role in funding the construction and maintenance of infrastructural 
mechanisms which artificially produce potable water. By implementing the practice of 
importing and subsidizing staple foods with a high water footprint, economic 
mechanisms can help to mitigate the potential for water scarcity to create higher food 
prices, which in turn has the potential to cause famine. Famine is a documented cause 
of conflict. When the severity of water scarcity and its harmful consequences are 
reduced, so too is the potential for water-based conflict. Economic mechanisms can 
also help to improve end-users’ physical accessibility to water. Similar to some of the 
manners in which they can help reduce water scarcity, economic mechanisms can 
indirectly aid in bolstering a nation’s physical access to water by providing funding 
sources for water distribution networks. When citizens have the ability to reliably 
access and afford clean water, the potential for water-based conflict is greatly reduced. 
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Research Design/Analysis 
 
Within the framework, the theoretical argument hinges upon one primary 
hypothesis which seeks to understand the role which infrastructural and economic 
mechanisms devised by Israel and Egypt have in either preventing water-based 
conflict—or, at the very least, the role they have had in delaying what many see as its 
imminent onset in the Middle East. Instead of simply using cross-sectional analysis to 
pair the countries together, the unique circumstances of both nations over a specified 
period of time will be compared using qualitative means. This is the appropriate 
strategy due to the prominent differences in culture, governmental structure, and water 
management practices. Though qualitative methods will be used, statistical data will be 
implemented to serve as supporting information and to bolster the approach’s validity.  
Inclusion of the two countries as case studies provides several important 
contrasts which help to highlight the ability of infrastructural and economic 
mechanisms to prevent a degree of water scarcity severe enough to precipitate water-
based conflict. By comparing two countries with markedly different economic 
situations, demographic challenges, governmental structures, and compensatory 
approaches to mitigating the effects of water scarcity itself, the qualitative cross-
sectional analysis highlights the broad degree of applicability and effectiveness that the 
two compensatory mechanisms highlighted in this piece have in staving off water-
based conflict. Economically, Israel is a world leader in water technology and has 
adequate capital to continue updating and building infrastructure; while Egypt has 
made notable strides in bolstering its own water-based infrastructure, its progress has 
been hindered by the government’s limited fiscal resources. Despite these challenges, 
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Egypt has still managed to create a relatively modest but potent set of economic and 
infrastructural mechanisms which have proven to be largely adequate in preventing the 
type of crippling water scarcity that can lead to significant water-based conflict. From 
a demographic standpoint, both countries have experienced considerable population 
growth, however, Egypt’s has been more severe than Israel’s. Keeping in mind the two 
nations’ respective budgetary landscapes and population challenges, both have 
managed to create potent economic mechanisms—those which have played an 
significant role in preventing water-based conflict.  
To help demonstrate the theory of how the potential for water-based conflict 
has been stemmed by infrastructural and economic mechanisms, the case studies of 
Israel and Egypt will be used. These two case studies provide several important 
contrasts from which to derive a greater understanding of the key role which the 
mechanisms have had in preventing water from becoming inaccessible to citizens. As 
water scarcity has become more severe, it has the potential to become an increasingly 
common catalyst of conflict rather than simply a contributing factor. To help 
understand this heightening potential of water to be a primary cause of conflict, Israel 
and Egypt’s infrastructural and economic mechanisms will be described and analyzed.  
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Case Studies Overview 
In the Israeli case study, infrastructural and economic mechanisms will be discussed in 
detail. The infrastructural mechanisms section will focus on three types of systems 
which Israel has used to combat water scarcity: desalination, wastewater treatment, and 
drip irrigation. With all three forms infrastructure, Israel has been a forward-thinking, 
technological leader. The economic mechanisms section will discuss Israel’s use of 
true-cost pricing models for water and the implementation of water meters to do the 
same. Israel has used these to types of mechanisms to avoid a situation in which water 
has the potential to precipitate conflict. Due to its limited natural water resources and 
its large population relative to its geographic size, Israel could have faced existential 
threats. 
In the Egyptian case study, there has been a similar effort to take action to 
lessen the effects of water scarcity through the use of both infrastructural and 
economic mechanisms. In accordance with Egypt’s specific set of circumstances, this 
push for mitigating effects of water scarcity has manifested itself differently than in 
Israel. With infrastructure, Egypt has undertaken large scale construction of dams and 
canals by which to capture and distribute, respectively, the Nile river’s aquatic 
resources. The primary economic mechanisms the country has employed to lessen the 
effects of water scarcity is that of food subsidization and large-scale food importation. 
When water becomes scarce, crops are more difficult to grow and food becomes more 
expensive. By importing food and subsidizing its expense to citizens, the country has 
used these practices to avert water-based conflict with an already high degree of 
volatility from the other significant challenges it currently faces. 
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Israel 
 
According to Seth Siegel, author of “Let There Be Water,” a best-selling book 
on Israeli water management practices, “Israel should have been a water basket case” 
(Schuster 2016). However, today, it is not. Instead, the country stands as a model to its 
neighbors and peer nations in the Middle East—one which proves that when discipline, 
appropriate incentive structures, and adequate cultural reinforcements are pervasively 
infused and woven into a nation’s collective identity, a sustainable path forward can be 
forged. Understanding the country’s founding and history is contextually important to 
fully grasping how Israel, whose geographic footprint is only slightly larger than the 
state of New Jersey, has managed to defy steep odds and survive despite formidable 
cultural, political and environmental hostility—all while emerging as a water hegemon 
in the process (The World Factbook: Israel). Its overall development from the mid-20th 
century to the present has placed a strong and deliberate focus on economic and 
infrastructural mechanisms which have allowed the country to largely avoid the severe 
impacts of endemic water scarcity, agricultural burdens and drinking water shortages, 
all of which can lead to conflict. Despite being subjected to a similar climate and 
natural shortage of water resources as its neighbors—such as Egypt, who relies on 
prodigious food imports to compensate for its crippling aquatic deficiency—Israel has 
engineered both technology and policy, and has, as a result, emerged as an oasis in a 
region of desiccation. Had Israel failed to precociously recognize the importance of 
water security and not taken action to ensure its maintenance, the country would likely 
be in a markedly different circumstance than it is today. 
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The State of Israel was established in 1948—in the aftermath of World War 
II—out of a belief that Jews deserved a land they could call their own. The very nature 
of the movement which created the sovereign nation also helps to explain its current 
aquatic self-sufficiency; while many who spearheaded the mid-20th century Zionist 
crusade have since passed, the relentless, boundary-pushing spirit which these leaders 
permanently instilled has allowed Israel and its people to not just survive, but prosper 
(World Zionist Organization). Moreover, if this culturally ingrained strength and 
perseverance of Israelis has served as the building blocks of what is now a strong 
Jewish nation, then the forward-looking, carefully drafted legislation and the 
trailblazing innovation that followed has almost certainly been the mortar. The success 
with water that Israel has enjoyed has been predominately shaped by bold, influential 
legislation dealing with the economic and infrastructural mechanisms needed to ensure 
security of the vital resource. 
In its relative infancy—only 11 years after achieving statehood—Israel drafted 
and implemented The Water Law of 1959, which has since proven to be the single 
most important piece of legal framework to date in the country’s path to prudent water 
management practices. This sweeping piece of legislation gave the State nearly 
complete autonomy over the country’s water resources and has served as the keystone 
of the nation’s water policy mechanisms—both infrastructural and economic—since its 
enactment. The law directly created an arsenal of explicit economic mechanisms 
through its delegation of responsibility to the Minister of Agriculture, whose duty it is 
to “prescribe norms for the quantity, quality, price, conditions of supply and use of 
water…and rules for the efficient and economic utilization of water” (Israel Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs). Indirectly, the policy created an environment conducive to the 
creation of a national economy which would foster and incentivize the creation of 
symbiotic public-private partnerships (Becker 2013). In time, the strong impetus to 
action set by the Water Law of 1959 would position Israel to become the leader in the 
creation of world-class water-related infrastructure and technology. 
Israel’s water-based infrastructure, reinforced by closely linked economic 
mechanisms governing the resource, has been the dominant force in transforming the 
small nation into an aquatic giant. However, the favorable position of Israel with 
regard to its water resources is not the product of any single innovation. Rather, the 
country has carefully designed a national infrastructure whose components, when 
integrated into a single system, achieve a collective value greater than the sum of their 
parts. There exists no panacea to solving the scourge of water scarcity. However, a 
small group of ubiquitously adopted technologies and proven pieces of infrastructure 
are responsible for the majority of the success that Israel has realized in its pursuit of 
aquatic independence. Though innovation in the water utilities, treatment, and 
distribution sector has indeed been expedient in recent years, surprisingly, one of the 
most prominent pieces of water-related infrastructure in Israel was also among the 
first. In 1964, the National Water Carrier of Israel began operation. While practically 
critical to the ability of Israelis to obtain the resources necessary to live within their 
own country, symbolically, the groundbreaking project was also a very potent 
statement by the nation of its inhabitants’ “will to survive” (Bickerton & Klausner 
2015)(Brans, de Haan, Nollkaemper, & Rinzema 1997). The National Water Carrier 
was built with the primary purpose of transporting water from the Sea of Galilee and 
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Lake Kinneret in the north to the country’s desiccated southern region and its center, 
the latter of which is where the majority of Israelis reside (Kantor). Spanning 
approximately 134 kilometers, the system is still considered to be “the country’s 
lifeline” (Rinat 2014)(Chellaney 2013). Contained within the Carrier’s vast water 
network are plants for desalination, facilities designed for wastewater treatment and 
innovative agricultural irrigation delivery systems. Together, these three technologies 
compose the backbone of Israel’s water mastery, and according to water experts, make 
Israel virtually “drought-proof” due to its ability to comfortably weather severe periods 
of renewable natural water scarcity (Sharon 2016). 
As mentioned earlier in the piece, only a small percentage—in fact, a fraction 
of a fraction—of the total quantity of water on earth is both easily accessible and in a 
form suitable for direct human consumption and use. The vast majority of the world’s 
water is contained in oceans in an unusable saline form. For Israel specifically, the 
natural renewable water resources it possesses are becoming increasingly scarce in a 
relative sense. With approximately 60% of its total landmass consisting of parched 
desert and a 273 kilometer coastline, desalination is well aligned with Israel’s specific 
geographic and environmental circumstances (The World Factbook: Israel)(New 
World Encyclopedia). While the scientific mechanisms and principles behind the 
procedure of desalination can be complex, the concept is simple: desalination is the 
removal of minerals—notably salt—from brackish or saline water to produce 
freshwater fit for human use and consumption (Encyclopaedia Britannica). Notably, 
this process of purification occurs naturally through the hydrologic cycle. However, in 
most places in the Middle East—Israel included—the quantity of water produced by 
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nature is insufficient to sustainably support populations’ needs (U.S Geological 
Survey). As a result of the country’s steadily increasing population, renewable water 
resources per capita have shrunk from 327 cubic meters in 1962 to only 91 cubic 
meters in 2014 (The World Bank Group 2016). As the country’s population continues 
to grow and its supply of natural renewable freshwater becomes increasingly scarce, 
desalination will gradually gain an even greater degree of prominence in the nation’s 
water management plan. 
Israel’s first desalination plant was built in 1997 in Eilat, a parched city in great 
need of a remedy for its chronic, crippling desiccation. Israeli leaders were keen in 
their early recognition of gradually decreasing natural water availability—especially 
on a per capita basis given a burgeoning population—and the importance of addressing 
the matter proactively. Not until relatively recently, however, has desalination become 
an integral part of the nation’s holistic water management practice. The primary 
motivation for the implementation of desalination in Israel is that “current demand and 
projected future demand cannot be met by natural freshwater sources alone” (Lipchin, 
Spiritos, & Becker 2013). The construction of both the National Water Carrier, and 
then, more than three decades later, the country’s first reverse-osmosis desalination 
plant, serves to demonstrate the country’s foresight. Today, Israel is home to five 
desalination plants which have the capacity to produce 600 million cubic meters of 
water annually, accounting for 55% of the nation’s domestic consumption (Jacobsen 
2016). These plants are among the most cost and energy-efficient in the world (OECD 
2011). With Israel’s steadily increasing population and its title of having the “highest 
birthrate in the developed world,” desalination will play an increasingly vital role in 
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allowing for the nation to supply the water needed to support its populace (Tal 2016). 
Without desalination as a primary provider of usable water—one that was introduced 
by employing deliberate and substantive policy to create infrastructural mechanisms—
Israel would likely be in the midst of a water crisis and be more susceptible to 
significant water-based conflict. 
While the augmentation of Israel’s water supply via artificial means is crucial 
to the current and future viability of the nation itself, desalination is only a single 
element integrated into the greater infrastructural design. A truly successful approach 
to water security must address issues pertaining to both supply and demand of the 
resource. For this reason, an equally important facet of the nation’s holistic water 
management strategy is that of demand-based management and efficiency. This second 
component to Israel’s multi-faceted water management strategy is partially achieved 
through its sparing use of water in agriculture. The successful push for greater resource 
utilization in food production has largely been made possible by the widespread 
adoption of innovative drip irrigation systems—a technology employed around the 
world, but first invented and put to use in Israel in 1959 (State of Israel Ministry of 
Industry Trade and Labor 2011). Drip irrigation uses pipes or tubing with small holes 
to achieve targeted delivery of small water droplets directly to plants’ roots (Shock 
2014). While more traditional irrigation techniques such as sprinklers achieve an 
approximate peak efficiency of 50%, properly installed drip irrigation systems are 
capable of delivering more than 90% of total water expenditures directly to the crop 
(Wilson & Bauer 2014). This increased efficiency can be largely attributed to the 
almost complete removal of evaporation losses—those commonly associated with 
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sprinkler or furrow irrigation—which also results in a considerably greater crop yield 
(Hoesktra 2013). 
While the initial capital cost of drip irrigation is greater than that of traditional 
systems, for Israel, the dividends of both continuous development and adoption of the 
technology have been staggering (Lamont, Orzolek, Harper, Kime, & Jarrett 2012). 
Despite being one of the more densely populated countries in the world in a climate 
that is notably inimical to agricultural growth, Israel has managed to foster significant 
agricultural production to support its population; the country produces almost 70% of 
its own food. It has accomplished this feat through a combination of desalination and 
extremely efficient use of aquatic resources (Megdal, Varady, & Eden 2013). In fact, 
approximately 60% of the country’s agricultural exports are grown in the central area 
of the country in the Arava desert (Cooney 2013). Not only does Israel directly benefit 
from using its own drip irrigation technology—growth in agricultural production rose 
by 20% between 2000 and 2009—it also gains a significant economic benefit from 
selling it to farmers around the world (OECD 2011). In 2017, experts project that the 
collective value of Israeli water technology exports will reach approximately $10 
billion, with the country controlling 50% of the global drip irrigation market (OECD 
2011). It is likely that no other innovation has had a greater and more visible impact on 
the country’s agricultural sector (Leichman 2012). Like desalination, drip irrigation 
enables Israel to better resist extreme weather cycles such as drought and other forms 
of climatic variation that would otherwise threaten seasonal crop yields. As climate 
change continues to progress, this bolstered resilience will be of ever increasing 
importance. 
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The final primary component to Israel’s infrastructural water management plan 
is the broad topic of wastewater treatment. Similar to its high degree of aptitude in 
both desalination and drip irrigation, Israel is heralded as a global leader in the 
wastewater treatment area due to its ambitious efforts to reuse water. The country 
reclaims and treats approximately 86% of the wastewater it generates, making it, in 
relative terms, the dominant force in the space—compared to many countries by 
several orders of magnitude. Spain is second to Israel in its repurposing of wastewater, 
“recycling approximately 17 percent of its effluent” (Kershner 2015). In the United 
States, “less than three-tenths of 1% of total water use…involves recycling” (Walsh 
2012). Furthermore, while traditional wastewater treatment processes often produce an 
end product suitable only for a limited number of applications, 50% of Israeli 
wastewater is subjected to a technologically advanced purification process which 
enables the final output to be used for all varieties of agriculture (Rinat 2016). In total, 
Israel produces approximately 450 million cubic meters of treated wastewater annually 
(Rinat 2015). Through innovative technology, Israel has managed to turn what was 
once a problem found in increasing amounts of effluent production into a largely 
positive outcome. 
Compared to Israel’s implementation of infrastructural mechanisms, its 
relatively expedient adoption of substantive economic mechanisms has been more 
reactive in nature. The push for the use of water management via fiscal policy came 
largely out of urgent necessity. In 2005, Israel was hit with a severe drought (Kershner 
2015). According to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), it 
was the worst and most period of desiccation to face the Eastern Mediterranean region 
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in approximately 900 years (Gray 2016). As a result, Israel was once again spurred 
into action to rethink its nations water usage practices and redefine the value it ascribes 
to the commodity itself. While Israel’s historical success with water can be primarily 
credited to the country’s foresight which led to the building of appropriate water 
infrastructure shortly after its founding, more recent successes have been boosted 
significantly by economic mechanisms and structures specifically designed to directly 
incentivize efficient water consumption. In the 21st century alone, as a result of new 
environmental challenges, Israel has realized notable gains in this area through the use 
of tariffs, taxes, innovative metering practices, fair pricing measures, and bureaucratic 
restructurings (Yago & Zecher 2016; Siegel 2015). By realigning incentive structures, 
removing political roadblocks to the realization of common sense efficiency 
improvements, and charging realistic prices for water, Israel has managed to address 
the second and equally important component of a holistic plan for aquatic 
sustainability found in demand-side management (Siegel 2015). While Israelis have 
always placed a high value on water, the distinct coupling of economics to water has 
proven substantive enough to further calcify the already firm public belief that the 
resource should be used sparingly.  
Economic mechanisms have played an important role in incentivizing all users 
in Israel—from individual users to large agricultural operations—to consume water 
more mindfully. One of the most prominent elements found in this set of strategic 
fiscal tools is the country’s policy of charging all consumers for the true production 
cost of the water it produces; in other words, the price of water in Israel captures a 
fairly representative share of the production, distribution, and infrastructure capital and 
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maintenance costs which are incurred to deliver the resource to end users (Fernandes 
2012). This stands in stark contrast to traditional practice in many countries where 
subsidies can often make the price of water to the consumer a mere fraction of its true 
cost (Lipton 2015). In 2012, approximately $456 billion was spent globally on water 
subsidies (Doom & Downing 2015). These seemingly positive, well-intentioned modes 
of fiscal aid often have negative and unintended economic consequences. In many 
countries around the world, the “low nominal cost of water…means that a lot of 
investments aimed at cutting its use don’t seem to offer satisfactory returns” 
(Henderson, Somers, & Stuchtey 2013). When projects to improve efficiency through 
building new infrastructure and repairing leaks, for example, cannot be fiscally 
justified because of an artificially depressed cost of water to the public, they are 
unlikely to be pursued. Israel has largely avoided this split incentive problem created 
by the rational dealing of independent economic actors by charging for the true price 
of water—and sometimes higher—to ensure that the resource is not thoughtlessly 
expended; in Israel, water can be—depending on the quantity used—expensive 
compared to its price per unit in many other places in the world. The overall scheme of 
pricing, economic tariffs, and funding strategies in Israel is composed of a web of 
symbiotically implemented mechanisms created in an effort to ensure that water usage 
and preservation remain in line with the collective interests of the entire nation. 
The true pricing of water and other economic mechanisms are designed to both 
promote efficient water usage and pay for construction of the infrastructure projects 
themselves. In this way, taxation, tariff mechanisms, and real cost pricing models have 
all offered a dual value proposition in their ability to both promote judicious usage and 
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to pay for the construction, maintenance, and addition of water-related infrastructure. 
According to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Israel 
derives “above average revenues from environmentally related taxes as a percentage of 
GDP...with revenues from environmentally related taxes [amounting] to 2.8% of GDP, 
compared with a weighted OECD average of 1.6%” (Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development 2016). This aggressive taxation to fund water projects 
helps to contextualize Israel’s success in the space. While today Israel’s taxes help to 
pay for water infrastructure, this system of taxation has not always been present in its 
current form. In 2008, under a reorganization of municipalities by the Water Authority, 
all Israelis began to pay the real cost of water. With this change came a price increase 
of approximately 40% (Bar-Eli 2014). The decision came in the midst of the worst 
drought Israel had faced in 900 years (Gray 2016). 
While water is intentionally expensive in Israel, the country has also managed 
to not be overzealous in its preservation efforts to a point where doing so negatively 
affects the daily lives of its citizens. Cognizant of the importance of ensuring that its 
policies aimed at preserving the nation’s water resources do not have an unfair or 
disproportionately regressive impact on urban users, the nation’s pricing scheme 
dictates that “for home use, Israelis pay a lower price for an initial quantity of water 
determined to cover the basic necessities…[and] the cost climbs for Israelis who use 
more” (Harris 2015). This system ensures that those who consciously choose to 
increase their usage for purposes beyond their true daily needs pay accordingly. In fact, 
because of efficient usage practices by citizens, the average monthly water bill for an 
Israeli household is approximately $30, a price roughly comparable to that in many 
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American cities (Jacobsen 2016). Just like the many countries that provide subsidies as 
a means to do so, Israel also wants to provide its citizens with affordable water. 
However, it has taken a fundamentally different approach to doing so. As previously 
mentioned, water subsidies have already been demonstrated to be a primary causal 
driver in disincentivizing infrastructure investment aimed at curbing aggregate societal 
usage. However, these subsidies have additional undesirable consequences; it has been 
found that when countries employ water subsidies, they are often not reaching the low-
income recipients for whom the aid was originally intended. The subsidies are 
regressive in nature in that they “disproportionately [benefit] upper income groups,” 
giving financial support to members of a socioeconomic demographic who need it 
least (Doom & Downing 2015). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
in this system of unintended, regressive water welfare often found in low-income 
economies, “the poorest 20 percent of the population received on average less than 12 
percent of subsidies while the richest [20% of the population] received almost 30 
percent of the benefits” (Lipton 2015). 
Another important facet of Israel’s economic framework governing and 
influencing the efficient use of water is found in its mandatory imposition of metering 
systems (Rejwan 2015). With regard to the topic of this piece, it’s important to note 
that the measurement and monitoring technology has characteristics of both an 
infrastructural and economic mechanism. While the equipment itself can be considered 
a piece of infrastructure, both individually and collectively, the meters have significant 
economic implications. Meters not only allow for customers to be accurately charged 
for their water consumption—making them a vital component of the overall funding 
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strategy for water infrastructure—but also gives the Israeli government valuable 
insight into consumption trends and the overall efficiency of the distribution system. 
Doing so allows for leaks to be fixed and usage and supply to be optimized, all of 
which saves money for the entire system. 
 
Egypt 
As the largest Arab country, Egypt has a long history of playing an important 
role in both regional and international politics (Yglesias 2011). Today, the country 
faces many destabilizing influences derived from a host of diverse, interrelated factors. 
The nation’s largest challenge is overpopulation—a worsening demographic trend that 
has put a severe strain on the country’s systems, government, and economy (Fahim 
2013). Overpopulation can be directly linked—as at least a significant contributing 
factor—to many of the other prominent hardships found in Egypt. Between 1950 and 
2016, Egypt’s population has more than quadrupled from 22 million to over 91 million 
(Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014; Fadel, 2016). To the 
outside world, Egypt’s economy and government seem largely unstable; within the 
country itself, 72% percent of citizens believe the “country is headed in the wrong 
direction” (Wike 2014). In recent decades, Egyptian oil production peaked and then 
began a steady decline (Park 2015); this contraction of one of the country’s largest 
industries has been met with a considerable drop in much-needed revenue for the 
nation—money that could have been used to help solve its numerous other prominent 
challenges (Calcuttawala 2016). Youth unemployment of highly-educated males aged 
15-29 is rising, and is even higher than that of illiterate males of the same age, creating 
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a sense of anger and hopelessness amongst a demographic demonstrated to have the 
highest propensity to engage in “criminal as well as political violence” (Amer 2007; 
Ghafar 2016; LaGraffe 2012). Because of high unemployment, this same cohort of 
young citizens faces a poverty rate of over 50% (Aggour 2015). This high rate of 
poverty is occurring concurrently with a rise in the basic cost of living, putting an even 
greater strain on a portion of the population with the greatest likelihood to incite 
violent conflict. Though the country is already heavily reliant on imports to feed its 
population, agriculture in Egypt is also declining (Weisenthal 2011). A host of 
factors—including a currency crisis—have caused food prices in the country to rise 
considerably (Michaelson 2016).  
In addition to all of these issues, Egypt currently faces severe and worsening 
water scarcity. Today, it threatens to both worsen, and be worsened by, some of 
Egypt’s other major challenges. For example, there is a direct causal link between 
overpopulation and water scarcity as “population size is fundamentally linked to water 
use” (Boberg 2005). Paradoxically, examination of the country’s historical relationship 
with water also offers an important explanation for why the nation, with its many 
daunting challenges and destabilizing influences, has not been subjected to violent 
conflict as a result of a notable scarcity of the fundamental resource. According to the 
United Nations, Egypt will “be approaching a state of ‘absolute water crisis’” by 2025 
(Ezz & Arafat 2015). With so many destabilizing influences and classic contributing 
factors to violent conflict, it seems—based upon later discussion of political theory—
as if water scarcity should have already catalyzed violent conflict in the large Arab 
nation. Instead, Egypt has used water to do exactly the opposite. Egypt is important 
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because it has managed to employ a series of compensatory, stop-gap measures to 
ensure its short-term viability in spite of serious water shortage. Water management 
strategies have played a primary role in this effort. Egypt has avoided potential conflict 
by implementing both infrastructural and economic mechanisms in an attempt to 
compensate for their mounting water scarcity. Had the country not taken action to 
introduce a means by which to continue to provide water to end users in spite of the 
resource’s scarcity, its situation would likely be far bleaker than it is today.  
Just like its aquatically adept northeastern neighbor, the driving forces and 
circumstances through which Egypt achieved statehood have played a significant role 
in shaping the long-term manifestation of its relative successes with regard to water 
management practices. Egypt was formally declared a republic in 1953 after being 
overtaken by successful coup leader and soon-to-be president Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
The de facto autocrat officially became the country’s chief executive in 1956 and was 
the only candidate on the ballot, receiving 99.95% of the vote. “In the same ballot, 
Nasser’s new constitution, under which Egypt became a one-party socialist state,” was 
approved in a similar fashion (History.com 2010). In his first years as president, 
Nasser was aware of the impending population crisis and took initial steps to attempt 
to combat the demographic trend. However, in the late 1950s, he changed his position 
and abandoned active efforts to correct the undesirable growth, believing that the 
issue—which has transformed into the crippling overpopulation seen today in 
contemporary Egypt—would self correct (Winckler 2005). Another notable 
development that took place with Nasser—one especially relevant today—is that of the 
welfare state. Under the autocrat, Egypt “took on the role of provider…implementing a 
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welfare state…[with] subsidized food, housing, education, [and] healthcare” (Kalin 
2014). With regard to water, some of Nasser’s policies have proven to have a positive 
albeit unintended impact on water management in the country. 
Egypt’s water crisis is particularly notable when considering the country’s 
access to one of the largest freshwater resources in the world. For millennia, the Nile, 
the world’s longest river, has played an essential role in the very existence of Egypt 
(Mark 2009). So integral has the transnational body of water been to the country’s 
continued survival that philosopher and historian Herodotus once famously referred to 
Egypt as the “gift of the Nile” (Casson 2001). Over time, the nation has become 
completely dependent upon the river and its seemingly endless aquatic resources, and, 
as a result, its people have “developed a deep sense of entitlement” (Yohannes 2008). 
This culture of privileged use is still present today with the Nile supplying Egypt with 
98% of its overall water consumption (Sullivan 2014). However, the river also exists 
as a constant and painfully symbolic reminder of Egypt’s squandered past 
opportunities to position itself to achieve future resource sustainability. When the 
country’s population was smaller, withdrawals and usage were maintained at a 
sustainable level. Today, with a burgeoning citizenry and the heightening effects of 
climate change, the river’s capacity to support life is being tested (Oestigaard 2012). 
Further aggravating the already delicate environmental situation is the “virtually 
unchecked industrial pollution” to which the Nile is subjected (Sherif & Aaref 2015). 
Every year, approximately “4.5 millions tons of pollutants, which include untreated or 
partially untreated industrial waste, agricultural waste and sewage” are discarded in the 
river (Zaher 2015). The implications of this careless adulteration to the vital public 
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water resource are both notable and ironic. In a closed-loop, self-antagonizing fashion, 
the agricultural system falls victim to, and is hindered by, the very same water 
pollution which its own operations play a major role in creating. Because the 
agricultural sector relies disproportionately on the usage of Nile water—agriculture 
accounts for 83% of total Nile usage in Egypt—pollution has an adverse affect on crop 
production and efficiency (Abou-Ali & El-Ayouti 2013). 
Before examining the economic and infrastructural measures which Egypt has 
implemented to avoid a situation in which water serves as a catalyst for violent 
conflict, it’s important to understand the relationship between water and some of 
Egypt’s other major problems including overpopulation and reduced oil revenues. As 
previously mentioned, overpopulation and water scarcity are closely connected. As 
population rises and natural water availability remains unchanged, the amount of water 
available per capita decreases. With this rise in population also comes a greater 
demand for land; increased development comes at the direct expense of land available 
for agriculture while also being a primary cause of increasing desertification, which 
further reduces arable fields suitable for growing food (Weisenthal, 2011). Water 
scarcity, caused in part by overpopulation, has also manifested itself as a primary 
threat to Egyptian agriculture. In Egypt, “water is so scarce [that] some farmers are 
forced to use untreated sewage to irrigate their crops” (Amin 2010). This type of 
desperation-driven activity can result in further detriment to the agricultural system—
repeated use of untreated, highly saline water eventually renders land unusable for 
growing crops (Amin 2010). All of these stresses are playing out concurrently with the 
reality that as Egypt’s population continues to grow, it will need more water and food 
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to sustain itself. Currently, the country’s ability to provide both of these vital resources 
is being pushed to its limits. 
Egypt was once rife with petroleum. Now, however, it poses a greater challenge 
and liability than it does an opportunity. Since the late 1930s when Egypt began first 
producing and exporting crude oil in large commercial quantities, the country has 
enjoyed a considerable financial influx from the exploitation of the valuable natural 
resource (Khaled, 2011). Today, Egypt is the largest non-OPEC producer of crude oil 
on the African continent and the second-largest producer of natural gas; in 2011, these 
two industries accounted for 10 percent of government revenue and 38% of the 
country’s exports (Natural Resource Governance Institute). However, despite being a 
major producer, because of the country’s growing energy needs, Egypt is a net oil 
importer. Further compounding Egypt’s economic troubles, the country’s oil 
production reached its peak in the 1990s and has experienced a significant drop in the 
past two decades (Park, 2015). With the nation’s large natural gas reserves, a recent 
announcement made by Egypt’s Oil Ministry stating that the government’s goal for a 
30% increase in production of the petroleum product by 2019 demonstrates the 
country’s urgent need to fill the economic void left by waning crude oil production 
(Calcuttawala, 2016). The decreasing oil trade is primarily significant because it leaves 
the Egyptian government with fewer resources with which to address an even more 
pressing issues: food and water security. Furthermore, petroleum products are also a 
key ingredient for many fertilizers and provide much needed energy to power 
irrigation and water treatment facilities.  
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Because of Egypt’s large and growing population, the country faces a 
significant ongoing challenge in ensuring adequate collection, storage, treatment, and 
distribution of enough water to satisfy the needs of its residential, commercial and 
agricultural end users. Today, Egypt has an impressive system of water management 
which operates on a considerable scale to provide for its diverse array of users. 
Historically, many of Egypt’s efforts with infrastructural water management have been 
centered around the Nile river and the use of dams and barrages as a means by which 
to tap its water resources for agriculture. The three major primary types of 
infrastructure associated with handling the Nile’s vast inflows are canals, dams, and 
artificial lakes. In 1833, long before Egypt achieved statehood, the Delta Barrages 
began construction and were completed in 1843 (Encyclopedia.com 2004). Additions 
to the scheme of barrages—a type of dam—were subsequently constructed in different 
locations and completed in 1861, “after which [the system] was extended and 
improved…marking the beginning of modern irrigation in the Nile valley” (Smith, 
Hurst, & El-Kammash 2016). In 1899, the construction of Egypt’s first major dam in 
Aswan near the border of Sudan, now known as the “first” Aswan Dam, began. After 
its original construction, the dam underwent two separate phases of enlargement 
between 1907 and 1934 to increase its capacity (Leonard 2006). In 1970, the Aswan 
High Dam was finished. For the first time, because of the dam’s enormous size as one 
the biggest embankment dams in the world, Egypt had the ability to control and 
capture the annual Nile flood which occurs as a result of rains from Central Africa and 
snow and rain originating from the Ethiopian Highlands  (The Editors of Encyclopedia 
Britannica 2012; PBS 2001; Carnegie Museum of Natural History). With the 
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completion of the High Aswan Dam, Egypt achieved “century-storage,” meaning that 
the country had the ability to store more than a year of its total water usage using the 
key piece of infrastructure (Cookson-Hills & Selin 2016). Dams have been a key 
component to Egypt’s efforts to prevent a water scarcity severe enough to precipitate 
conflict.  
While dams are integral to water collection and management, canals are the 
former’s equally important distribution counterpart. While Egypt is best known for the 
Suez Canal, the artificial waterway was built not to transport water but rather as a 
shipping lane. The country’s system of irrigation and water collection canals is equally 
important to the economy but perhaps lesser known. Egypt has more than 40,000 
kilometers of public irrigation canals and waterways fed by the Nile (Petit, et al. 2015). 
With the majority of water in Egypt allocated to agriculture, the primary purpose of the 
vast network of waterways is to provide water for millions of farmers to grow their 
crops—despite “municipal and industrial requirements [having] the highest priority” 
(Allam, et al. 2005). Egyptian agriculture depends almost completely on this means of 
artificial irrigation due to the extremely arid environment and scarce rainfall (Smith, et. 
al 2012). The canal system can be understood hierarchically, with principal canals 
being those which are connected directly to the Nile, followed by main canals, 
principal canals, branch canals, and distributary canals. Distributary canals and branch 
canals are often those connected to mesqas, private ditches which carry water directly 
to agricultural fields (Pinstrup-Andersen, et. al 2009). Approximately 80,000 
kilometers of mesqas exist in Egypt (Allan & Mallat 1995). 
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Due to the presence of the Nile and its vast aquatic resources, Egypt “is known 
as one of the oldest agricultural civilizations” (El-Nahrawy 2011). While the country 
was among the first to develop the characteristically sedentary lifestyle, today, from an 
economic standpoint, the presence of agriculture in society is waning. In 1974, for the 
first time in the country’s history, “Egypt became a net importer of agricultural 
commodities” (Richards 1980). Since then, the country has experienced a steady 
decline total agricultural production in tandem with a rising population. In the 1960s, 
agriculture represented approximately 30% of the nation’s GDP, today it is less than 
half of that, standing at about 14.5% (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations 2016). Nonetheless, if Egypt had failed to create the proper irrigation structure 
needed to connect the Nile’s water resources to the many, the nation would rely almost 
completely on food imports. Given the current economic strain which food imports 
already place on the country when complemented with domestic production, it seems 
reasonable to assume that importation of all needed calories for the nation would be 
unaffordable. 
Perhaps more than any other country, Egypt has become known for its 
successful, albeit economically taxing policy of mass food importation. Because of 
aforementioned factors which inhibit a higher degree of agricultural output, the 
country depends primarily on prodigious grain importation to feed its population. The 
country takes the policy a step further by also subsidizing basic food staples, helping to 
ensure that its citizens have affordable calories in spite of crippling water scarcity. The 
causal link between drought and an increase in food prices is especially relevant in 
countries in Africa and the Middle East (The World Bank 2012). In this way, Egypt 
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has created a policy of consequence avoidance, one in which it applies a temporary fix 
to an issue which will remain a permanent problem unless sufficient measures are 
taken. This sobering reality has also played a large influence on many of the 
environmental and agricultural issues which the country currently faces. As the 
population grows, and with only a very small portion of the country’s land being 
arable, supplying enough food domestically to feed its population has remained out of 
reach. Additionally, the high population density has made pollution a primary concern. 
With more people and increasingly scarce water resources, Egypt has had to 
adopt an economic policy mechanism of large-scale food importation to satisfy the 
ever-increasing demands of its population. The government currently employs a vast 
and exorbitantly expensive food subsidy program which helps to feed approximately 
70 million Egyptians. To provide adequate nourishment to a majority of their 
population, the national government has had to increasingly rely on the import of 
wheat—buying more than 10 million tons per year, making it the world’s largest 
importer of the staple food crop (Fick and Bushra, 2014). Though this mechanism of 
economic trade has staved off overly devastating wide-scale hunger, extrapolating on 
current growth in both population and decreases in water resources, it soon may not be 
enough. Despite Egypt’s large and developed importation mechanism—one which it 
uses as a compensatory measure to combat the negative effects which water shortages 
have on its ability to produce its own food—the country is also suffering with 
production on its current farm land. As water scarcity continues to increase, spurring 
Egypt to spend even more on import bill that already costs $4.5 billion annually to 
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provide bread for less than $0.01 per loaf to its citizens, and revenues from oil continue 
to decline, the country’s long-term economic viability remains uncertain. 
It is important to recognize Egypt’s use of water as an indirect economic 
mechanism to support its population through agriculture through water. While 
agricultural output as a percentage of GDP has declined significantly in the past few 
decades, the industry still remains an important component of the Egyptian economy. 
Currently, agriculture accounts for 13.3% of Egypt’s GDP and sectors directly related 
to agriculture account for another 20%. In total, agriculture “provides formal and 
informal employment for about 6.7 million person and about 8.25 million persons 
respectively” (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 
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Conclusion 
 
Water is one of the most vital elements to life on earth—and its availability is 
finite. Furthermore, water’s significance extends beyond its importance in supporting 
human life: water is also a key factor in both current and future peace around the world. 
History has shown that because of water’s status as an essential albeit limited commodity, 
conflict has the potential to arise when it is scarce. However, in the Middle East, 
significant water-based conflict has been largely absent despite the region’s notable water 
scarcity. One of the primary reasons for this illogical phenomenon is the employment of 
substantive compensatory strategies found in the implementation of both infrastructural 
and economic mechanisms. The power of these two mechanisms in helping to prevent a 
level of water scarcity severe enough to cause water-based conflict has been illustrated by 
examining the case studies of both Israel and Egypt.  
While the appropriate research design was employed to study the relationship 
between water scarcity, conflict, and the high degree of impact which compensatory 
mechanisms have in preventing water-based conflict, the scope of the research is 
inherently limited by its inclusion of only two country case studies. This intrinsic 
limitation only serves to highlight the enormity and complexity of the challenge which 
humanity faces in developing a sustainable relationship with the Earth’s finite water 
resources. Creating a research design with a greater number of case studies would have 
provided a larger aggregate body of information from which to make inferences, 
however, doing so would have come at the direct expense of having the ability to develop 
a deeper understanding of the complicated dynamics of the specific nations being studied. 
By focusing on two countries, the research was able contextualize and explain the cases 
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of Israel and Egypt in greater detail. The aforementioned limitation also emphasizes the 
pressing need for all countries—both those currently facing water scarcity and those 
potentially at risk of experiencing it in the future—to take substantive action to better 
understand their own unique circumstances as they relate to water. Only when all nations 
achieve a better understanding of their role in averting global water crisis can truly 
holistic progress be made. 
It is imperative that the issues of global water scarcity are addressed in their 
current form, however, all efforts to do so must also be made with the future in mind. 
Water stands at the epicenter of what is perhaps humanity’s greatest and most pressing 
challenge to-date: anthropogenic climate change. As the planet continues to warm, the 
delicate equilibrium of the world’s ecosystems is expected to begin wavering in an 
increasingly violent fashion. Predictions by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), a joint initiative between the United Nations and the World 
Meteorological Organization, have projected that global temperatures have the potential 
to rise 1.1-6.4 °C by the end of the century. These numbers are somewhat dependent 
upon the degree of future global industrial development and anthropogenic emissions 
reductions (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007). While efforts are 
underway to curtail emissions to prevent such a trajectory, water management 
mechanisms should be designed and implemented to be able to withstand the 
consequences of the more severe potential trajectories projected by the IPCC. This type 
of hedged “future proofing”—done to account for the worst-case scenarios—will require 
a substantial capital expenditure by countries around the world. However, the costs of 
inaction have the potential to be even higher. Infrastructural and economic mechanisms 
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will play a key role in helping the world to bolster its water security and prepare for a 
future in which environmental challenges will be greater than they are today. 
The implementation of infrastructural and economic mechanisms has another 
considerable benefit beyond its ability to mitigate issues of water scarcity and water-
based conflict. While the connection between water and conflict has been explored in-
depth, the equally important counterpart to this relationship must also be acknowledged: 
water holds considerable potential in engendering more peaceful international relations. 
The human need for water is universal and shared by every person on the planet, 
transcending differences in religion, culture, language and geography. Not only should 
actions to address global water security and scarcity be seen as pre-emptive pursuits from 
which to prevent future conflict, but also framed as opportunities from which to realize 
more peaceful international relations; water has the power to not only prevent bad 
outcomes, but also to create good ones. 
There is no silver bullet to solving the world’s challenges with water. Attitudes 
must be reassessed and values changed. The discussion of the viewpoints and 
compensatory mechanisms in this piece is by no means conclusive, nor should the 
mechanisms themselves be mistaken as panaceas for the many pressing issues which are 
highlighted in the piece. To achieve success, framing the most important elements of the 
problem and understanding their underlying facets on an intimate level will be critical. 
Research, development, and intergovernmental cooperation are also crucially important 
because, in the end, every country in the world has a vested interest in realizing a future 
in which humans achieve an indefinitely sustainable relationship with the planet’s water 
resources. Many paths forward exist from which to start solving the world’s water 
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problems, however, one certainty stands above all else: doing nothing is simply not an 
option. 
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